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The Changing Face of Rural
Enterprises
Since the 1970s these enterprises have been accommodating and
adjusting to the ever-moving institutional environment
Wei Zou
1 The aim of this paper1 is to provide an overview of the emergence and development of
China’s  xiangzhen  qiye,  the  township  and  village  enterprises  (TVEs)2,  from  an
institutional  viewpoint.  The questions that  interest  us  include:  How is  it  that  TVEs
emerged under seemingly adverse political and economic conditions? How have they
been able to achieve such an exceptional performance over the past two decades? What
role did central and local governments play in their development? What role have TVEs
played in China’s economic reforms as a whole? Is the development of TVEs a special
case in China alone or is it a paradigm that can be generalised to other less developed
countries ? We emphasise the point that the emergence of the TVEs is not a forced
institutional change designed and guided by the central government, but an induced
institutional innovation that began within the society. Instead of seeing TVEs as a once-
and-for-all institutional invention, we treat the institutional innovation embodied in
TVEs  as  a  function  of  the  institutional  environment  per  se.  The  endogeneity  of
institutional innovation not only contributes greatly to TVE development but is also an
alternative approach to rural industrialisation.
2 During  the  last  two  decades,  China  has  pursued  rural  industrialisation  at  an
unprecedented  speed  through  the  development  of  the  TVEs.  Although  other
economies,  such  as  Taiwan’s,  took  similar  roads  to  rural  industrialisation,  TVEs  in
China have no equal elsewhere in their unprecedented growth rate and magnitude.
Official statistics indicate that from 1978 to 1994, the average annual growth rate of
rural industrial output was about 27%, almost three times the growth rate of national
GDP. Rural industry surpassed agriculture in size in 1987 and now comprises half of the
total Chinese economy. From 1986 to 1998, the average asset scale of TVEs increased
tenfold and the average scale annual growth rate is about 25% (see figures 1 to 5). 
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3 The magnitude and exceptional  performance of  the TVEs in China have drawn the
attention  of  the  international  academic  community.  The  new  growth  theory
emphasises the positive externality created by accumulated knowledge, human capital
and social capital in stimulating sustainable growth3. Culture theory addresses the role
of co-operative culture among Chinese villages in enhancing TVE development4. Others,
so fascinated by the perversion of public firms owned by local governments, that they
regarded  the  public  ownership  of  TVEs  as  static,  optimal  institutional  choices  by
peasants5.  Another  theory  explains  the  success  of  TVEs  from  a  standpoint  of
comparative advantage6. While these studies may serve as explanations for the success
enjoyed by TVEs in 1980s, they do not analyse the specific institutional environment
and  its  change  behind  the  TVE  performance,  nor  do  they  offer  a  comprehensive
framework for predicting the likely development of TVEs.
4 In contrast with the experience of Eastern Europe where privatisation also took place
and the privatised enterprises  operated without  direct  interference of  government,
TVEs are neither state-owned nor private enterprises, and are innately correlated with
local government. Many people think TVEs have benefited from their vaguely-defined
property rights, from the two-track economic system under transition and from the
paternalist care of local officials, yet this experience is too specific to be generalised as
a model for rural  industrialisation.  The slowdown of TVE growth since 1990 clouds
their  prospects.  While  the general  significance of  TVE development is  doubted,  the
dynamism of the nature of the TVEs is rarely mentioned. This paper will trace the path
of endogenous institutional innovation within them.
5 We first present a brief description of the institutional environment in rural China up
to the 1970s to explain the emergence of the TVEs in the late 1970s and early 1980s. We
then focus on the 1980s when TVEs prospered, and analyse the specific ownership in
these  enterprises.  The  problem  at  the  heart  of  this  debate  is  the  role  of  local
governments, the nature of collective ownership in TVEs and the related significance of
this  to  TVE performance.  We continue with their  reorganisation,  restructuring and
privatisation since the 1990s,  and end in summary with the dynamic change in the
institutional structure in TVEs over the last three decades.
The emergence of TVEs as an induced institutional innovation
6 An  institution  is  a  set  of  behavioural  rules  which  pertain  to  social,  political  and
economic  behaviour,  and  are  used  to  govern  a  variety  of  social  interactions7.
Institutions  can  be  separated  into  two  categories:  institutional  environment  and
institutional arrangement. The former is the set of fundamental political, social and
legal  ground  rules  that  govern  the  ways  in  which  people  can  co-operate  and/or
compete with each other8.  Most people mixed these two categories and treated the
institutional  change  as  an  exogenous  variable.  Others  focus  on  some  kind  of
institutional  arrangement,  e.g.  ownership,  while  supposing  the  institutional
environment  is  always  given9.  Yet  in  a  less  developed  economy,  both  institutional
environment and institutional arrangement are far from optimal and need reform. Our
first step will be to briefly summarise the institutional environment in pre-reform rural
China to explain why TVEs emerged at that time and what they meant to rural China.
7 China has a history of a hugely diversified and more or less isolated rural economy.
Before  1949,  the  output  of  handicraft  workshops  and  other  household  sideline
production in rural China was about 1.16 billion yuan in 1957 prices10, which is not an
accurate figure if  taking into account the lengthy civil  war. All the workshops then
The Changing Face of Rural Enterprises
China Perspectives, 50 | november- december 2003
2
were privately owned and operated. The natural development of rural capitalism was
cut  off  and  pre-reform  rural  China  witnessed  two  nationwide  industrialisation
campaigns.
8 The first of these was the rural co-operative movement in the 1950s. Because of the
nationwide collective dream and the uncertainty of political winds, few dared to form
handicraft co-operatives even though they were asked to. In 1957, the value of sideline
production only accounted for roughly 4.3% of the total rural output. Rural industry
was  on  the  verge  of  disappearing.  Obviously  dissatisfied  with  the  poverty  and
backwardness  in  rural  China,  central  government  moved  further  to  implement
communist industrialisation. In the Great Leap Forward period of 1958-59, consistent
with  the  heavy  industry  development  strategy,  large-scale  commune  and  brigade
enterprises  (shedui  qiye)  were  established,  many  of  which  were  engaged  in  the
production  of  steel  with  rudimentary  technology.  These  enterprises  employed  18
million people by the end of 1958, but the results were catastrophic and triggered acute
shortages  and  nationwide  famine.  In  the  subsequent  years,  the  output  value  of
commune and brigade enterprises plunged to 410 million yuan (1957 prices) in 1963,
i.e., only 35% of the value in 1949. During the following six years, the development of
rural industry was in stagnation. On the one hand, although private enterprises were
compatible with the backward condition in rural China and transaction cost-saving, the
political costs were too high to sustain them. On the other hand, it was impossible for
communist  industrialisation to succeed.  Although the political  costs  were in reality
fairly low, the wide-spread poverty and immobility of resources, could hardly support
industrialisation on such a huge scale.
9 Then came the second industrialisation in the early 1970s, when central government
emphasised  agricultural  mechanisms  and  there  appeared  a  tendency  for
decentralisation in economic planning and an advocate for “self-reliance”. Many rural
areas  tried  again  to  set  up  commune  and  brigade  enterprises  manufacturing
agricultural  machinery,  repairing tools,  providing hydroelectric  power or  supplying
construction materials. Despite their limitations in technology, scale and management,
the  output  of  commune  and  brigade  enterprises  grew at  an  average  rate  of  25.7%
during  1972-7611.  Basically,  these  enterprises  were  politically  safe  due  to  their
communist  ownership,  and  economically  acceptable  due  to  their  small  size,  local—
dependency and primary technology.
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Number of TVEs (millions)
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 1997, 1998. The Yearbook of Chinese Township and Village
Enterprises, 1995, 1996 1997, 1998. China Economic Yearbook, 1997, 1998.
10 The spurt in the growth of TVEs in the late 1970s and early 1980s was not a natural
evolution  of  commune  and  brigade  enterprises.  Even  in  1978,  the  output  value  of
commune and brigade enterprises only accounted for 21.2% of total rural output, and
their employment only 9.5% of total rural labour. These enterprises were targeted at
agricultural  modernisation  rather  than  at  absorbing  rural  labour,  they  paid  more
attention to political requirement than to economic rationale. They were consequences
of political movement implemented by the state, but the emergence of TVEs was not
designed  or  guided  by  the  state,  even  not  known to  the  latter.  The  peasants  took
advantage  of  cheap  land  and  labour,  semi-formal  or  informal  fund-pooling,  the
authority of the existing rural hierarchy or kinship, of local market and low transaction
costs,  of  central  government  ignorance,  and eroding control  over  income disparity
since the adoption of the household responsibility system, and gradually shifted their
resources into rural industry. 
11 TVEs  emerged  spontaneously  first  in  relatively  resource-abundant  coastal  areas,
especially  the  Yangze  and  Pearl  River  deltas,  then  expanded  to  relatively isolated
central areas. Because of the differences in economic or institutional factors, such as
the traditional resource base, proximity to markets and to urban industry, pre-1949
industrial and commercial traditions, delivery requirements for grain and other crops
under the agricultural planning system, and pre-reform rural industrialisation, there
was  a  remarkable  degree  of  diversity  among  TVEs.  What  interests  us  most  is  the
plurality of ownership structures in TVEs.
The nature of TVEs and their dynamism
12 The intimate  relationship witnessed between local  governments  and TVEs has  long
been  singled  out  as  an  important  characteristic  of  TVEs  and  has  instigated  great
academic interest and controversy. The negative school regards the TVEs as a partially
successful makeshift, half-way house to real private ownership12. Others take a positive
viewpoint,  yet  differ  in  their  arguments.  Some  regard  the  involvement  of  local
governments as a central government decision to co-ordinate the decentralised market
economy with a relatively centralised political system13. Some see the collective firms
in  rural  China  as  a  manifestation  of  cultural  common  sense14.  Some  link  the  local
government  ownership  with  imperfect  market,  imperfect  information,  and  the
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gradualist features of China’s reform15.  Still  others regard TVEs as an informal joint
venture between the state and the private sector, and as a result, they benefit from
both the collective system and privatisation16. 
13 The  negative  school  pays  too  much  attention  to  the  strain  or  even  contradiction
between local governments and TVEs. Actually the marriage between these two were
not always involuntary. The positive school is right in its more or less institutional
perspective, yet both the institutional arrangements and the institutional environment
are taken as static or exogenous. We will analyse the nature of TVEs and its dynamism
from emergence up to  now to  shed light  on how the ownership in  TVEs  has  been
changing according to the institutional environment.
1978-1984: collective ownership dominates
14 During this phase, collective ownership dominated across the country, even in 1984,
67.46%  of  TVE  employment  and  85.63%  of  TVE  output  came  from  collectives.  The
features of collective ownership in TVEs can be summarised as: 
• 1. The production factors (land, labour, capital and materials, etc.) were owned by the
community. Namely each person in the community had the same amount of property and
no-one had complete ownership. 
• 2. There was no mobility of production factors across communities. Capital accumulation
and fund-raising was restricted in the town or village and conducted by the local
governments. 
• 3. There was no possibility for members of the community to transfer their rights to TVE
property. If they left the community, they automatically lost their part of the property. 
• 4. The rewards for members of the community were wages or public services provided by
local governments. TVEs profits were controlled by local governments, rather than by any
single entity. 
• 5. The leaders of local governments had a big say in production, management and
distribution of TVEs, yet they still treated collective TVEs as public property.
 
2. Labor force employed in TVEs
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 1997, 1998. The Yearbook of Chinese Township and Village
Enterprises, 1995, 1996 1997, 1998. China Economic Yearbook, 1997, 1998.
15 Compared  with  standard  property  rights,  the  property  rights  structure  of  TVEs  is
incomplete. Ownership is not exclusive (figures 1 and 2), or transferable (figure 3). Nor
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is there a specific entity responsible (figures 4 and 5). As publicly-owned entities, what
collective TVEs are to a small rural community is what state-owned enterprises are to
the Chinese. It is easy to predict that TVEs may perform just as poorly state-owned
enterprises due to the vaguely-defined property rights. Yet TVE performance was much
better than expected. It seems to challenge the property rights theory, which is based
on  the  context  of  a  developed  economy,  yet  the  ownership  arrangement  in  TVEs
reflects only the institutional environment from which it emerged.
16 The  planning  system  dominated  the  allocation  of  production  factors,  which  was
strongly favourable to collective enterprises. It was a long time before the prices of
most  products  were  finally  liberalised.  The  important  materials―steel,  coal, wood,
etc.―were strictly controlled and rationed because of severe shortages. In 1981, 53% of
the production of coal was rationed; 52% of steel production was rationed. In 1983, the
percentages  were  still  as  high  as  51%  and  58%  respectively17.  In  rural  areas,  local
governments were privileged enough to be able to allocate the materials that served as
a precondition  for  the  establishment  of  TVEs.  Also,  most  of  the  TVEs  emerged  as
resources-based industries, needing to accumulate agricultural products, such as grain,
cotton,  oil,  etc.,  as  inputs.  But  most  agricultural  products  circulated  within  the
planning system. Usually the private enterprises had to pay twice the prices paid by
collective enterprises for inputs from state units or supply-and-marketing co-ops. In
some cases, it may be almost impossible to obtain rationed inputs such as cement or
timber  without  resorting  to  corruption.  Instead  of  repeatedly  bribing  the  local
government  officials,  the  peasant  households  often  found that  it  paid  to  put  their
enterprises under collective control.
17 Collective TVEs had more access to land, one of the most precious resources in rural
China with a high labour-to-land ratio. Land shortages worsened, and competition for
land became fiercer with the establishment of small and medium-sized towns and the
upsurge  of  TVEs.  The  local  governments  tended  to  assign  land  to  collective  TVEs
because they were considered as collective assets. In some land-short societies there
was also a tendency to hoard land. Because land was allocated by the state, specialised
local bureaus and collective TVEs considered it their own property. They frequently
acquired more land than they could use and even let it lie idle for possible future use,
aggravating the land shortage and making it even more difficult for private enterprises
to get land.
18 Additionally, collective TVEs enjoy easy and low interest rate loans. Lack of capital and
underdevelopment  of  rural  financing  system  were  severe  problems  in  rural  China.
Since  Rural  Credit  Co-operatives  (RCC)  have  long  been  directed  by  the  highly
concentrated  plan  system, the  relationship  between  these  co-operatives  and  local
government was strong, while that between the RCCs and the farmers was weak. The
volume of loan funds was too limited, and the loan-to-deposit ratio was low. Interest
rates were not flexible and ill-suited to the competitive terrain. RCCs seemed to fall
between  formal  and  informal  financial  systems.  Formal  because  it  was  under the
control  of  Agricultural  Bank  of  China,  the  bank  specialising  in  supporting  rural
development  and  implementing  rural  policies,  and  informal  because  it  used  to  be
manipulated by local government to wield significant power upon TVEs without proper
economic accounting. Obviously, the RCCs have extended more loans to collective TVEs
than  to  private  enterprises  because  of  government  directives,  not  because  the
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collective TVEs are intrinsically more efficient or because local banks recognised that
the local governments were better assessors of risk. 
19 Secondly, there was a tradition for local officials to interfere in economic activities,
with an expectation of taking advantage of their political priority to make themselves
better off not only economically but also politically. Actually economic performance
has always been one of the most important criteria for official promotion at each level.
Government officials,  through the frequent,  political  movements  against  right-wing
tendencies, realised that it was better for them to keep a left-wing front on economic
activities. Moreover, learning from the experience of central government control over
the state-owned enterprises, local officials tended to take collective ownership of TVEs
for granted. This created an environment in which TVEs could hardly develop without
being owned, managed or closely entwined with local governments.
20 There were 1.5 million commune and brigade enterprises in 1978, with employment of
28  million  and  gross  income  of  43,000  million  yuan  18.  These  firms  were  directly
controlled by local governments and were renamed TVEs in 1984. The pre-reform rural
bureaucracy  remained  largely  intact  despite  organisational  reform  that  had  led  to
abolition of the commune system, and kept powerful control over economic activities
including  those  of  TVEs.  The  newly  established  township  government,  which
constituted  the  lowest  level  of  the  formal  state  structure,  reflected  extensive
organisational  changes  in  line  with  the  shift  to  greater  reliance  on  market  co-
ordination.  However,  there  remained  considerable  overlapping  of  ties  between  the
township  governments  and  the  new  corporations  that  were  supposed  to  manage
enterprises.  Frequently the same cadres who were most influential  in the township
governments  also  held  prominent  positions  in  the  new  township  corporations.
Moreover,  many  cadres  who  had  served  in  the  former  commune  administration
remained  prominent  in  the  new township  governments.  They  controlled  the  RCCs,
mobilised  the  resources,  decided  the  allocation  of  land,  and  managed  economic
activities in a dictatorial way. So on the township or town level, almost all the large
TVEs were transferred from former commune and brigade enterprises.
21 At the village level,  the situation seemed to be different.  The institutional  reforms,
especially the prevalence of the household responsibility system, had a greater impact.
Village cadres had little  direct control  over the management of  economic activities
since collective enterprises were leased to private parties, equipment sold out, and land
assigned to individual households. But village cadres still influenced the economy by
negotiating  contracts  and  leases,  and  acting  as  middlemen  and  brokers  in  local
economic  transactions.  Nonetheless,  the  power  of  village  cadres  had  shrunk
considerably, leaving room for private enterprises (usually less than five employees in
size) to emerge at village level.
22 Thirdly, the organisational environment was favourable for direct local government
control  over  TVEs.  The  legal  system  in  China  was  quite  incomplete.  Instead  of
implementing a single law with regard to all enterprises, there were different laws for
different enterprises. Yet there was no specific law for TVEs until as late as 1997. So the
hierarchical administration for TVEs was inconsistent both vertically and horizontally.
23 TVEs  used  to  be  seen  as  a  supplement  to  agriculture,  the  vertical  administrative
structure supervising them was rather loose. Unlike other industrial sectors in China
that are defined by product type, TVEs included any factory, firm, enterprise, hotel and
shop located in the rural areas. There was a great diversity in TVE production, almost
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covering all the sectors. Thus TVEs were subject to much vertical administration. The
Township  Enterprise  Administrative,  established  in  1979  under  the  Ministry  of
Agriculture, was supposed to be the top bureaucratic structure guiding rural industries,
but other ministries and commissions had their own offices for rural industry. Because
rural industrial production crossed so many product lines and therefore challenged the
products  of  so  many  ministries,  most  ministries  had  to  co-ordinate  with  rural
industries in some manner.  The same situation existed at the provincial  level.  As a
result, these overlapping bureaucracies actually provided such a loose supervision that
direct control often lied with the local governments.
24 For example, county supply and marketing co-operatives, which until the mid-1980s
had a monopoly on the purchase and sale of most agricultural inputs and production,
controlled  a  large  number  of  rural  enterprises.  In  Wujiang  County  of  Suzhou
Municipality, the supply and marketing co-operatives owned 42 factories and employed
more  than  8,000  workers19.  In  Zouping  County,  Shandong  province,  there  were  26
collective enterprises under county control. Among them, 11 were owned by the supply
and marketing co-ops20. The most important reason for government intervention was
that  TVEs  had  become  the  local  governments’  main  source  of  revenue.  With  the
introduction of the household responsibility system, each level of local governments
contacted with its immediate superior to turn over a fixed amount of funds and keep
the  remaining  surplus.  As  a  result,  “local  governments  use  every  method possible,
including many that straddle the boundaries of legality, to promote rural industry, at
the same time milking it to supplement their government budget”.
25 Fourthly, The political environment was favourable for experimentalism in rural areas.
Due  to  long-lasting  poverty  and  sharp  inequality  between  rural  and  urban  areas,
central government began to pay more attention to countryside grievances, complaints
and  strong  desire  for  de-collectivisation.  As  far  as  peasants  were  concerned,  their
pursuit  for  private  interest  was  a  cause  rather  than a  consequence of  reform.  The
initiative to do away with collective farming, surreptitiously at first and increasingly
openly later, essentially confronting the regime with a fait accompli. They also knew
that  their  pursuit  of  prosperity  could  not  be  fulfilled  if  in  contradiction  with
communist  political  requirements.  After  their  experience  of  the  household
responsibility system, the peasants realised that local governments could selectively
implement  policies  from central  government  and the connivance and cover-ups  by
sympathetic local cadres could help TVEs survive before they got official authorisation. 
26 As  for  central  government,  there  was  a  rapid  change  in  the  political  climate,
particularly the tolerance of experimentation symbolised by the slogan, “truth through
facts”  (shishi  qiushi).  From  1978-84,  although  without  sanction  from  the  central
government, the number of rural enterprises increased fourfold, the amount of labour
force  doubled,  gross  output  value  increased  fourfold.  The  significant  performance
surprised the  central  government  so  much that  it  finally  stepped in  to  express  its
support.  In 1984,  TVEs were formally  named xiangzhen qiye.  And the peasants  were
highly  encouraged  to  find  their  own  ways  to  prosperity,  among  which  TVEs  were
suggested successful.
27 Therefore,  in the first phrase,  TVEs appeared in advance of the extant institutional
framework and were more or less underground. They had to be firmly rooted in the
pre-reform  institutional  environment  and  take  advantage  of  the  leeway  of
inconsistency of the administration system. Their survival depended on two different,
The Changing Face of Rural Enterprises
China Perspectives, 50 | november- december 2003
8
but connected  capabilities.  One  was  management  capability  to  make  production
decisions. The other, synthesised as “procurement capability”, was the ability to co-
ordinate in a non-market allocation system, to obtain preferential policy treatment,
and to solve disputes with other production units at low cost through economic and
non-economic  methods.  During  this  phase,  management  capability  seemed  not  so
significant,  because  there  was  little  competition  from  state-owned  enterprises  and
among TVEs due to  the immobility  of  factors  and the shortage of  consumer goods
markets. But procurement capability may have been of great importance due to the
lack of markets, especially factor markets. TVE managers had to get production factors,
loans, licences, etc., through administrative bureaucrats other than through markets.
Most productions and transactions were personalised and access to scarce inputs was a
matter  of  privilege.  The  contracts  were  costly  to  write  and  enforce  because  many
business rules were either vaguely defined or hard to enforce. Taking advantage of the
original administrative resources,  the direct control of local governments helped to
reduce their management and transaction costs. 
1984-89: The Diversity of Ownership
28 In this phrase, the dominance of collective ownership weakened, a variety of ownership
appeared with a  sharp increase  in  private  enterprises.  In  1984,  72.7% of  rural  TVE
enterprises  were  peasant-run joint  co-operative  (gufen  hezuo  danwei)  and  private
businesses (siying qiye), and produced 16% of TVE output value21. In 1985, non-collective
rural enterprises increased to 87.1%. Their contribution to TVE output value increased
to 27.1% (see figures  6  and 7).  The diversity  of  ownership was also an endogenous
consequence of the then changed institutional environment.
29 A slowdown of agrarian development emerged due to the worsening of agricultural
returns. In 1984, the grain output dropped for the first time since 1978 and stagnated
until  1989,  which  symbolised  the  decreasing  returns  to  the  one-shot  household
responsibility system reform. Agricultural investment from all sources lagged, leading
to a decline in such indicators as area covered by irrigation. Rural per capita income,
which had more than doubled between 1978 and 1984, largely stagnated in real terms
during the remainders of the 1980s. An important reason for this was that in 1985, the
state  in  effect  lowered procurement  prices  for  grain  to  reduce the  costs  of  buying
above-quota grain and the burdens of subsiding urban consumers, while keeping high
industrial input prices.
 
3. Gross output of TVEs
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 1997, 1998. The Yearbook of Chinese Township and Village
Enterprises, 1995, 1996 1997, 1998. China Economic Yearbook, 1997, 1998.
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4. Industrial output of TVEs
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 1997, 1998. The Yearbook of Chinese Township and Village
Enterprises, 1995, 1996 1997, 1998. China Economic Yearbook, 1997, 1998.
30 This  situation led to  two-fold results.  Agriculture could no longer support  TVEs by
production factors and capital accumulation, it even became a drain on local resources.
More  and  more  peasants  were  pushed  away  from  agrarian  activity  because  of  the
enlarging disparities between those whose earnings came largely from non-agricultural
sources and those standard farmers. Rural income in the coastal provinces, where TVEs
were concentrated, grew much more rapidly than in the central and western provinces.
Due to the rural territorial inequality, farmers complained that it did not pay to farm.
Local governments accordingly tried to divert procurement funds to more profitable
purposes (e.g., hounding diesel fuel and selling at market prices), which resulted in a
large-scale issuance of IOUs (bai tiao) and further disadvantaging farms. 
31 The  political  climate  changed  in  favour  of  the  development  of  non-collective
enterprises. The economic policies from the central government can be summarised as
the  following  popular  slogans  then.  First,  “controlling  better  by  controlling  less”
(fenquan rangli). The decentralised fiscal and personnel system was designed to increase
responsibilities and incentive, it also encouraged local cadres to be hyper-responsive to
their immediate superiors and hyper-enthusiastic in collecting fiscal revenues. Second,
“White or black, a cat is good as long as it can catch rats” (bulun baimao heimao, zhuadao
laoshu  jiu  shi  haomao).  Deng’s  words  gave  an  indirect  permission  for  diversity  in
ownership structures, and they were interpreted by lower-level cadres as “collective or
private, an enterprise is good as long as it can contribute revenues”. Third, “let a few
people get rich first” (rang yibufen ren xian fu qilai). Rural China has a deep belief in
Confucianism and a long tradition for egalitarian distribution of income, but people
were unwilling to put with the resulting equally widespread poverty any longer, the
government also had to compromise. Fourth, “wait and see” (guanwang). There was a
tendency for central government to reaffirm private enterprises. Although there were
rules  restricting private enterprises to a  rather small  size,  the government did not
immediately stop or punish violations of the rules. In 1988, a constitutional amendment
was drafted giving private enterprises owners legal status for the first time since the
1950s. 
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5. Contribution of TVEs to rural income per capita
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 1997, 1998. The Yearbook of Chinese Township and Village
Enterprises, 1995, 1996 1997, 1998. China Economic Yearbook, 1997, 1998.
32 Industrial profits and taxes were the main source of local prosperity. Rural industry
yielded funds essential  for  the building of  infrastructure that  could sustain further
industrialisation and attract outside, including foreign, investment. Mindful of the link
between outstanding performance and attractive rewards, local cadres were strongly
motivated  to  seek  “impressive  achievements”  (zheng  ji).  By  then,  economic
development has been made the central task of the state and the Party. Governments at
every level wanted to showcase their achievements by finishing some “visible projects”
during their tenure of office. To finance these undertakings, they had no choice but to
order their subordinates to pursue higher growth rates and extract more from the local
population. As the pursuit of economic growth snowballed, local governments loosened
the regulation on all  kinds of rural enterprises.  The unprecedented development of
private  rural  enterprises  is  a  result.  In  1984  there  were  4.2  million  private  rural
enterprises, accounting for 69.28% in the total number of TVEs, while they accounted
for  23.54% of  TVE employment  and  14.37% of  TVE output.  But  one  year  later,  the
private rural enterprises surged to 10.37 million (84.87% of total TVEs), accounting for
38% of  total  rural  labour,  and the  percentage  of  their  output  in  TVE output  value
increased by more than 10 points to about (see figures 6 and 7). 
33 During this nascent period, ownership in private rural enterprises was incomplete. At
the beginning, private enterprises were legitimate mainly through their small size and
marginality. There were five main sources for private owners and managers: lower-
level local government cadres or former cadres; supply and marketing personnel of
collective TVEs; employees with technical skills; former workers of state-owned
enterprises; and farmers. The success of private enterprises depended more on such
“capable persons” than on funds, land, labour, and the other factors of production.
These capable persons, although without much formal education in management, had
an innate sensitivity to the market and had, more or less, access to scarce resources
under  the  planning  system.  Generally  the  owners  of  household  factories  were
responsible  for  all  their  profits  or  losses,  they  had  a  stronger  incentive  for
accumulation and development. Yet the operating environment of private enterprises
was  still  unpredictable  and  risky.  In those  areas  where  the  traditional  collective
economy  was  strong,  private  enterprises  were  discriminated  against  or  even
confiscated  to  leave  room  for  collective  TVEs.  Taking  advantage  of  the  political
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environment,  local  governments  exploited  and crowded out  private  enterprises  for
non-economic  reasons.  In  1985,  when  the  burgeoning  private  and  lower  village
enterprises drew labour and business away from county- and township-owned firms in
Wuxi County, Jiangsu province, the local government imposed restrictions upon these
firms.  Relatives  of  the  skilled  workers  who  left  collective  enterprises  to  work  for
private ones were permanently barred from jobs in TVEs. By these methods, the county
drove out the competition, allowing private enterprises to survive only in commerce,
transport and services22. 
 
6.Labor force in private TVEs
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 1997. The Yearbook of Chinese Township and Village Enterprises,
1995, 1998. China Economic Yearbook, 1998.
34 Insecure property rights and imperfect markets are common features of transitional
and developing economies.  But  China has long held an anti-capitalism,  anti-private
property  ideology  that  the  peasant  households  always  feared  to  be  economically
correct, but politically incorrect. The political hazard was not just perceived, it  was
actual fact even in 1980s. For example, during the “anti-spiritual pollution campaign”
of  1983,  during  the  “anti-bourgeois  liberalisation  campaign”  in  1987,  and after  the
Tian’anmen Square Incident of 1989, private enterprises usually came under attack for
speculation, profiteering, tax evasion, sale of fake products,  pornography and other
social ills. 
35 Much  of  the  fieldwork  (Nee  and  Young,  1990;  Odgaard,  199023)  shows  that  local
governments adopted different attitudes towards different private enterprises, which
to a great degree determined how far and how fast the private enterprises can move
towards  capitalism.  The  private  enterprises  chose  their  ownership  structure
accordingly.  Generally  there  were  three  kinds  of  private  enterprises:  joint  family
enterprises (lianhu qiye), individual enterprises (geti qiye), and large private enterprises
(siying  qiye).  Joint  family  enterprises,  usually  received  support  from  most  cadres
because they were believed to be able to spread their wealth around in a village and are
easier to control due to their dependence on public support for inputs and supplies.
Individual enterprises also had fairly broad cadre support because they were usually
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based  on  technical  skills  and  could  benefit  the  local  community  with  revenue
redistribution. As long as these individuals kept good relations with cadres, they could
survive  without  political  impediments.  Most  of  the  controversy  lay  with  the  large
private  enterprises.  They  competed  with  collective  enterprises  to  a  much  higher
degree,  they  aggravated  the  inequality  in  income distribution,  and  even  generated
social conflict in the villages. 
36 Besides legal means of controlling their development, local cadres resorted to illegal
means to convert successful large private enterprises into collective enterprises, or to
confiscating  their  business  licences.  In  Renshou  County,  Sichuan  province,  a  very
successful entrepreneur producing bamboo furniture for export was ordered to convert
his large enterprise into a collectively owned enterprise. He objected and threatened to
take the case to court. After some time, a compromise was reached: the entrepreneur
could keep his factory if he conducted a training programme to pass his special skills to
technicians in collective enterprises. Another entrepreneur faced a similar threat of
expropriation. The village committee intended to take over his profitable cotton mill.
He was less fortunate and eventually his business licence was officially revoked under
the guise of shortage of electric power, while a village-operated cotton mill was built
less than 50 miles away, using the same source of energy24. The local government aimed
to sabotage competition from private enterprise once they learnt of their profitability.
37 However, peasant households were used to circumventing policy barriers and making
compromises  to  protect  their  interests  (as  the bamboo producer did).  Most  private
enterprises,  small  as  they  were,  survived.  To  make their  property  rights  not  only
economically  viable,  but  also  politically  secure,  they would  spontaneously  curb the
scale of development. The relatively larger private enterprises, mostly took the name of
“co-operatives” or “collectives” and blurred the property rights of their enterprises as
a response to the policy instability, the lack of rule of law, and the ensuing disorder and
inefficiency  in  the  regulatory  environment.  So  there  was  a  medley  of  ownership
arrangements in rural private enterprises, yet this feature helped the group of private
enterprises to meddle through the muddy water of bureaucracy and transition. 
After 1989: the restructuring and privatisation of TVEs
38 In the 1990s, a lot of embarrassing problems are reported in the TVEs. In addition to
being criticised as capturing the market share of the large state-owned enterprises,
wasting resources, creating pollution in rural areas, providing poor-quality products,
distorting the market by rent-seeking activities, TVEs also suffered from a slowdown in
growth rate and deterioration in main management indicators. In 1999, the average
rate of debt in TVEs was about 65%. In Wujin, Jiangsu, the debt rate of TVEs was 75.36%
on average, while in some was as high as 95% 25. Early in 1993, losses in TVEs were at
3.84%, and about three million had to shut down. This increased to 7.58% in 1994, and
15%  in  1997.  In  some  provinces  with  relatively  developed  TVEs,  losses  also
accumulated, in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, these were at 10% and 13% respectively. 
39  Many people think the difficulties experienced by the TVEs resulted from the Asian
financial crisis and the subsequent drop in exports. Actually as early as 1993, evidence
for  the  slowdown  was  obvious.  The  crisis  made  things  worse,  especially  for  those
coastal  areas  that  depended  more  on  export  and  foreign  investment.  The  sluggish
domestic  market  resulted  in  a  huge  involuntary  inventory  in  TVEs,  which  even
worsened the lack of working capital. The inefficiency of the state-owned enterprises
and increasing urban unemployment and more lay-offs made it more difficult for rural
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labour to migrate to urban areas. The decrease of procurement prices of agricultural
products and continuous decrease of rural income left little room for TVEs to raise
funds  and  expand  rural  markets.  The  historical  linkage  with  the  local  community
restricted factor mobility, restrained the diffusion of information and technology, and
resulted in a similar structure of production and products across communities. In many
areas, technological innovation had been stagnant for years because of “tight budgets,
disconnected  distribution  channels,  broken  information  systems,  and  dispersed
personnel”26. Most of the problems were concealed when there was a wide shortage in
the domestic  market  and competition between different  communities  and different
enterprises  was  not  so  fierce.  As  the domestic  market  changes  from a seller’s  to  a
buyer’s market, and as the ration system gives way to the market system for resource
allocation, the former advantage from community linkages becomes a disadvantage or
even a burden. The extraordinary growth of TVEs based on the transitive institutional
environment is reduced to the normal growth rate painfully and with disturbance.
40 Roughly speaking, there are two groups of TVEs. The “Sunan Model” is based upon the
former  commune  and  brigade  enterprises,  mainly  owned  by  the  community  and
operated  by  politically  powerful  cadres  in  an  authoritarian  way,  and  in  which  the
income distribution is relatively equal. Most of these TVEs are located in areas with a
deep-rooted planning economy, e.g. south of Jiangsu (Sunan), from which comes the
name. The “Wenzhou Model” emerged in 1980s, was mainly small-scale, owned by rural
“capable persons” or elites, operated in a very flexible way to meet market demand for
miscellaneous items. Most of these TVEs are located in the south-east coastal areas,
typically Wenzhou in Zhejiang province. 
41 Early in the 1990s, the collective TVEs only accounted for about 7% of TVEs, yet for 44%
of employment and 69% of assets. They were usually called the “aircraft carriers” in
rural industry. Small as they were in employment and assets, private enterprises have
accounted for the lion’s share in terms of the number of TVEs. But TVEs from different
groups have experienced the same “symptoms”. 
• 1. The labour absorptive capacity in TVEs dropped sharply. From 1978-84, elasticity of
employment to output was 0.57, but it dropped to 0.26 in 1993, then to 0.15 in 1994. In 1997,
TVEs only absorbed four million rural labourers, compared with an average of 7.17 million
in 1985-90. 
• 2. Part of TVEs endured the “state-owned enterprises disease”, such as loose and inactive
management, unclear responsibility, too much social duty or family burden, too much
interference from government. 
• 3. The competitiveness declined due to too frequent shift in markets, “guerilla-style”
management and increasing labour costs. 
• 4. Disputes and lawsuits around property increased, and the average life expectancy of TVEs
shortened. 
42 The reasons for the difficulties lay in the vaguely-defined property rights. In the 1990s,
the conflict  between local  governments and the TVEs become a serious problem in
rural China. The focus of the conflict was the heavy burden imposed on the TVEs. With
the fiscal decentralisation, local governments were given “the right to do”,  but not
enough “right of financing”. They extended their hands to the pockets of the peasants,
and in particular to the more lucrative TVEs. This is usually referred to as “killing the
hen to get the eggs” or “drying the lake to catch fish”. Many TVEs were suffocated by
the  pressure  of  market  and  local  governments  and  remained  on  the  edge  of
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bankruptcy. Awareness of these crises pushed the “Sunan Model”, and the profit-pulled
“Wenzhou Model” to restructure their ownership and reform their governance. The
restructuring of ownership was referred to by many local officials as “changing from
higher-level  ownership  to  lower-level  ownership”,  i.e.  from  collective  to  private
ownership. When calculating “the rate of restructuring”, they summed up those that
have shifted from collective to private hands. In Wujin County, Jiangsu province, the
rate of restructuring was 73% in 1995 and 84.2% in 1996. Among 3,287 TVEs, 58 merged
into  enterprise  groups,  68  became shareholder  co-operatives,  1,408  were  leased,  55
auctioned, 221 sold, and 638 mortgaged. Similar data could be found elsewhere, which
showed a movement of privatisation. Both models changed so spontaneously and at a
similar  time (started in 1993 in Zhejiang and spread in 1995 to  Jiangsu)  that  there
seemed to be a convergence between them.
43 By restructuring, collective TVEs are supposed to become shareholder companies or
shareholder co-operatives, to be sold (or half-sold-half-rented) or to be auctioned. In
1993-94,  most  local  governments  preferred  the  “shareholder  company”  or  “co-
operative”, yet few know how to set up and manage this type of company. There are a
great number of “pseudo-shareholder” companies in the following features: 
• 1. Most restructured TVEs have few shareholders, whose investment but not shares is
counted; 
• 2. Most shareholders are from the same town, village or even the same family; 
• 3. In many companies, shareholders hold equal shares, in others the bosses dominate all
small shareholders; 
• 4. Most companies never issue equities to people outside their communities; 
• 5. Most shareholders keep the shares only when they stay in the companies, they can
withdraw their investment but cannot transfer their shares to others; 
• 6. Few shareholders care about their rights of participation or supervision, and never pay
attention to the difference between “one vote one share” and “one person one vote”; 
• 7. Many former managers naturally enjoy a new title and the biggest part of shares without
any change in operation or management. Although the shareholder TVEs are assumed to be
independent legal persons, they still bear the core of rural tradition in fund-raising,
employment, management and distribution. The efforts of directly restructuring TVEs into
shareholder enterprises turned out to be not as successful as expected.
 
The Changing Face of Rural Enterprises
China Perspectives, 50 | november- december 2003
15
7.Gross output of private TVEs 7.Gross output of private TVEs 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 1997. The Yearbook of Chinese Township and Village Enterprises,
1995, 1998. China Economic Yearbook, 1998.
44 Since 1995, privatisation has been the hot topic in TVEs. Actually the advantage of rural
government in allocating resources has been challenged, eroded and shaken by the
restructuring of TVEs. The macroeconomic situation also made further privatisation
possible. Private, joint-venture and co-operative enterprises mushroomed in China and
state-owned enterprises have been reformed since 1984.  More informal and private
credit  institutions  were  set  up  with  the  commercialisation  of  the  financial  system.
Collective TVEs lost their tax advantage after the taxation reform in 1994. Collective
TVEs have become so large and involved in diverse activities that they are very costly
for local governments to supervise. Actually, the withdrawal of local governments from
TVEs as owners is not forced by central government, nor by the request of peasants,
but  is  based  on  the  cost-benefit  analysis.  The  benefits  from  collective  TVEs  have
reduced to now being hardly able to cover the cost and trouble of running them. It is
actually more profitable to sell them. Although in official documents, only those small-
sized, vaguely profitable or inefficient collective TVEs can be sold, in practice, those
bigger and more efficient TVEs are the first choice for sale. Local governments regard
TVEs as their daughters, once beginning to “marry” them, they choose to marry out the
prettiest ones. As for the less pretty or ugly ones, they try to lower the price or even
transfer  them as  gifts  to  existing managers.  Meanwhile,  most  “red-capped” private
TVEs are taking off the cap and becoming real private ones.
45 With  the  privatisation  movement,  more  and  more  private  TVEs  try  to  set  up
shareholder companies with clearly-defined property rights, yet there is still  a long
way to go. Generally owners have a very strong kinship with the local community, and
besides  their  personal  pecuniary  goals,  they  have  many  other  non-pecuniary  goals
including  providing  employment  and  a  secure  future  for  the  family  members;  and
improving social  and official  status.  Since the property rights and the full  financial
rewards of entrepreneurs are not 100% secure, the incentives of private owners are
largely distorted. They use every opportunity to profit through legal or illegal means
and to take advantage of loopholes in the government’s regulatory system. They are
unwilling to undertake projects that require long-term investment, and prefer to spend
their earnings on building luxurious houses and purchasing other living facilities. But
they do not depend on community governments for financial or managerial help any
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more. Equity financing plays a more important role in corporate finance. According to
official statistics, from 1994-98, the equity capital in TVEs increased 17.85% annually,
and the percentage of equity in the whole capital increased from 36.02% to 39.73%.
While the debt ratio dropped from 65.73% in 1993 to 60.27% in 1998. More TVEs are
going public  and transfer  of  equity  is  allowed.  More  TVEs  separate  ownership  and
management,  formalising  such  activities  as  decision-making,  accounting  and  inside
auditing.  A  new generation  of  TVEs  is  preparing  to  compete  with  the  state-owned
enterprises and foreign companies marching into China following China’s entry into
the WTO.
46 The  past two  decades  in  rural  China  evidenced  a  huge  change  initiated  by  the
unprecedented industrialisation. In a less developed economy, rural industrialisation is
always  the  toughest  and  most  important  problem  within  the  process  of  economic
development and transition. TVEs, although they develop with strong characteristics
based on the specific features of the Chinese economy, provide an alternative approach
to rural industrialisation in an economy with an incomplete market system, loose legal
system, inefficient bureaucratic hierarchy, and more or less adverse environment for
the cultivation of entrepreneurship in isolated rural areas.
47 TVEs emerge from historically backward agriculture and rudimentary rural industry.
The economic landscape and environment in pre-reform China is typical in most less
developed economies, especially those Asian economies with a high labour-land ratio
and  a  low level  of  rural  mechanisation.  TVEs,  instead  of  developing  as  a  one-shot
institutional arrangement, are adjusting to the different institutional environment one
step  at  a  time. Thus  they  pursue  a  self-correcting,  self-enforcing  path  in  their
development,  which  greatly  reduces  the  transaction  costs  during  transition.  This
experience is of significance for those less developed economies with a deep-rooted
traditional economy and little acknowledgement for the modern economic system. 
48 As the institutional environment moves in a direction favourable to a freer market
economy, TVEs also restructure their institutional arrangement from an improvised,
transitory ownership arrangement to a more formalised well-defined property rights
arrangement. There may be some distortion or even chaos during the adjustment, the
former experience of gradual adjustment to different institutional environment helps
to smooth the rearrangement. This leaves rural China as well as other less developed
rural economies a legacy to steel any political or economic winds.
49 The change occurring in rural China with the development of the TVEs is not a simple
passage from one order to another, but rearrangements in the patterns of how multiple
orders are interwoven. The Chinese economy is in transition, yet the rural China is
undergoing a transformation. Sometimes, the rural transformation goes in advance of
the  transition  (just  as  happened  in  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s),  and  the
transformation  takes  a  disguised  structure  as  a  compromise.  Sometimes  the
transformation  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  transition  and  results  in  a  flourishing
achievement (as happened throughout the 1980s). Sometimes the transformation lags
behind the transition and suffers harsh experience (as  happened in the 1990s).  Yet
transformation continues to occur through adaptations, rearrangements, permutations
and  reconfigurations  of  the  existing  institutional  environment  and  organisational
forms. With all the past performance and future prospects, China’s experience of TVE
development serves as an alternative approach to rural industrialisation.
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